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[L. A. No. 23375. In Bank. Feb. 17, 1956.]

Estate of SPENCER H. CHARTERS, Deceased. SECURITY-FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LOS ANGELES,
as Trustee, etc., Petitioner and Appellant, v. IRENE
MARIE CHARTERS YEAKEL et at, Respondents;
LAURA HOERNER, Legatee and Appellant.
[1] Trusts-Actions and Proceedings-A";Ipeal.-A testamentary
trustee is entitled to appeal from orders made on its ptltition
for instructions as to what to do with accumulated trust
income.
[2] ld. - Accounting by Trustee - Judgment - Conclusiveness.When a decree of the probate court settling an account of a
trustee becomes final, it is conclusive, in the absence of extrinsic fraud, on all parties interested in the estate. (Prob.
Code, § 1123.)
[8] Judgments-Equitable Relief-Fraud.-A court has inherent
power. to set aside a decree for extrinsic fraud when a party
has been prevented from fully presenting his ease and there
has therefore been no adversary trial of the issue.
[4] Id.-Res Judicata-Reasons for Doctrine.-The public policy
underlying the principle of res judicata that there must be an
end to litigation requires that the issues involved in a ease be
set at rest by a final judgment, and such policy must be
considered together with the policy that a party shall not be
deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which fully to
present his ease.
[6] Trusts-Accounting by Trustee-Judgment-Conclusiveness.Where a testamentary trustee which is also the guardian of the
estate of a minor beneficiary of the trust (who is not otherwise
represented) seeks a final settlement of an account current
after selling a trust asset in which such beneficiary has an
interest, an order settling such account, with the trustee
accounting to itself as guardian, is not binding on the beneficiary, and the probate court has jurisdiction to inquire into
it, since the beneficiary was deprived of the opportunity to
present her claims to the court and there was therefore no
adversary trial or decision of the issue.

,

[3] See Cal.Jur., Judgments, § 123; Am.Jur., Judgments, § 660.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Trusts, § 377; [2,5] Trusts, § 359(9);
[3) Judgments,
251(2); (4) Judgments, § 339; [6J Trusts,
§ 359(1); [7, 8, 10] Trusts, § 167; [9] Trusts, § 224; [11] Trusts,
§ 211 j [12] Trusts, § 346.

*
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[6] Id.-Accounting by Truotee-Jurisdiction.-Where the probate
court has jurisdiction under Prob. Code, § 1120, of a controversy between a testamentary trustee and a beneficiary of the
trust with respect to settlement of an account current, the
court can bring to its aid the full equitable and legal powers
with which it as a superior court is invested.
[7] Id.-Construction.-A provision of a testamentary trust that
"The Trustee shall permit [the minor beneficiary J ••• and
her guardian . . . to use and occupy my resi,dence for so long
a time as they may desire" was not given only for the period
that the beneficiary was under the care of a guardian, and a
decree of distribution making it clear that during her minority
the decision to occupy was not the beneficiary's alone but that
of her guardian cannot reasonably be construed as terminating
the right to occupy the residence when she reached 21.
[81 Id.-Construction.-Where a testamentary trust gave a beneficiary and her guardian the right to occupy decedent's residence for "so long a time as they may desire," and there was
nothing in the decree of distribution to indicate that their
.lesire to occupy could be expressed only once and not for
"so long a time" any time they desired, the rirrht to occupy
was not lost merely because the beneficiary and her guardian
once vacated the residence, and the decree could not be construed as denying them the right thereafter to return.
[9J Id.-Control of Trust Property-Sale.-Where the beneficiary
of a testamentary trust and her guardian had the right during
her minority to occupy decedent's residence for so long a time
any time they desired and where the beneficiary had the right
to occupy it so long as she desired on the termination of her
guardianship, the trustee had no authority to defeat that right
by selling the residence.
[10] Id.-Construction.-Where a decree of distribution incorporating the lnnguage of a will provides that when the beneficiary
of a trust shall attain the age of 21 years the trustce shall pay
such beneficiary during her lifetime or until termination of thc
trust estate a sum or amount monthly which, when added to
payments she may receive from insurance policies, shall amount
to $200, and that if the income available for distribution is not
sufficient to make such payments the trustee shall use such part
of the principal as may be necessary to make such payments,
such provision plainly provides for $~OO per month, no more
and no less, and cannot be construed as providing that income
in excess thereof must be u5rd for the beneficiary's support.
[11] Id.-Control of Trust Property-Supervisory Power of Court.
-An absolute discretion, exercised in good faith by a trustee,
[l1J See Cal.Jur., Trusts, § 182; Am.Jur., Trusts, § 279 et seq.
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cannot be controlled by a court on considerations going to the
soundness of the discretion exercised, and the court cannot
interfere to review the trustee's action in the absence of pleadings, proof and findings of fraud, bad faith or abuse of
discretion.
[12] Id.-Instrnctions as to Administration of Trust.-In a proceeding by a testamentary trustee for instructions as to disposition of accumulated trust income, an order that all of the
excess income shall be distrihuted to a designated beneficiary
was contrary to Civ. Code, § 733, declaring that the "income
bl'longs to the persons presumptively entitled to the next
e\'cntual intcrest," where the named benefieiary was the person
presumptively entitled to the next eventual interest. only as to
a eertain SUIll she was to receive when she reached certain ages,
and to her belonged only that proportion of the accumulated
income as that sum bore to the value of the total trust estate,
and where the remainder was given to her issue, and as to that
they were the persons presumptively entitled to the next
eventual interest regardless of whether or not they were in
being at the time of the ccurt's order.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County giving instructions to a testamentary trustee. John
Gee Clark, Judge. One order affirmed; other orders reversed.
Henahcy & Beeman and Howard B. Hcnshey for Petitioner
and Appellant.
Lawler, Felix & Hall, William T. Coffin, Brady, Nossaman
& Walker and Walter L. Nossaman as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Petitioner and Appellant.
Hill, Farrer & Burrill and William C. Farrer for Legatee
and Appellant.
Norman Elliott and Charles P. Lester, in pro. per., Robertson, Harney & Behr, David Robertson, Ruth Michaelson,
Robertson, Harney, Drummond & Dorsey and Vernon W.
Hunt, Jr., for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Irene Marie Charters Yeakel i~ the only
child of Irene Meyers Charters and Spencer H. Charters. She
was born on .Tune 15,1931. Her mother died January 2,1942,
leaving her by will the sum of $4,730.05. Her father was
appointed guardian of her estate. On January 25, 1943,
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Spencer H. Charters died leaving a will dated February 12,
1942, the material provisions of which are quoted below.1
On February 5, 1943, the Security-First National Bank
of Los Angeles was appointed Successor Guardian of the
Estate of Irene. On February I, 1943, the will was admitted
l"FIFTH: In the event my dnl1ghter, IRExr MAR)E CH.\RTERS, survives the final distribution of my estate, I give, devise and bequeath the
residue of my estate, real and personal, v,'herever situated, hereinafter
termed the 'trust estate,' to SECURITy-FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF Los
ANGELES, a national banking association, in trust, to hold, manage and
distribute as hereinafter provided:
"(A) (1) Until my daughter, IRENE.
attains the age of Twentyone (21) years, my Trustee shall distribute to her, or for her use and
benefit, such sums or amounts in monthly installments as may be necessary for her proper support, maintenance and education, using therefor
so much of the principal of the Trust Estate as may be necessary if the
net income available for distribution is insufficient.
"(2) From and after the date upon which my daughter, IRENE.
shall attain the age of Twenty-one (21) years, my Trustee shall pay to
my said daughter, during her lifetime or until the termination of the
Trust Estate, Buch sum or amount monthly which, when added to the
payments which she may receive from any insurance policies on my life,
ahall amount to a monthly income of Two HUNDRED DOLLARS ($200.00).
If the income available for distribution is not sufficient to make the
aforesaid monthly payments my Trnstee shall use such part of the principal as may be necessary to make such monthly payments.
"(3) My Trustee shall permit my daughter, IRENE
and her
guardian or such person as may be entrusted with her eare, to use and
occupy my residence at 1745 North Vista Street, Los Angeles, California,
for so long a time as they may desire, without payment of rent and
without deduction from any of the payments herein provided. In connection with such use, my said daughter or her guardian or such person
as may be entrusted with her care, shall, so long as she or they desire,
have the use, without charge, of the household furniture and furnishings,
silver, books, pictures, paintings, works of art, and bric-a-brac which
may be located in said residence.
" (4) When and at such time as my daughter, IRENE
shall cease
to occupy my home at the above address the Trustee shall make such
disposition of the personal property used in connection with said home
as it may deem advisable .
.. (5) Should any of my jewelry become a part of the Trust Estate
the same shall be distributed to my daughter, IRENE , • 0, at such time
as, in the opinion of the Trustee, she is qualified to receive and care
for the same.
.. (6) In addition to the payments hereinabove provided for my daughter, IRENE .. 0, my Trustee shall pay to her the sum of FIVE THOUSAND
DOLLARS ($5000.00) from the principal of the Trust Estate on the date
upon which she attains the age of Thirty (30) years, and an additional
sum of FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($5000.00) from the principal of the
Trust estate on the date upon which she attains the age of Thirtyfive (35) years, and an additional sum of FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS
($5000.00) from the principal of the Trust Estate on the date upon
which she attains the age of Forty (40) years of age .
.. (7) My Trustee shall distribute to AMELIA MEYERS, my deceased
wife'S mother, or pay for her use and benefit, such sums or amounts in
1l10nthly installments as may be necessary for her proper support and
maintenance during her lifetime, using therefor so much of the principal
0

0

0

0
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0,
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to probate. On :May 25, 1944, the decree of distribution was
entered declaring the Security-First National Bank of Los
Angeles (hereinafter called the trustee) to be the trustee
of the testamentary trust created by the wilJ.2
In 1946 Irene moved from the family home and went to
live with the guardian of her person. On July 16, 1946, the
trustee sold the home and added the proceeds to the trust
estate. Nine accounts current were filed by the trustee, and
orders were entered settling and approving each of them.
In the trustee's third account currcn7 appears the following:
" (a) The stucco bungalow carried herein at $11,000 00 was
sold for the sum of $25,000.00. After paying the commission
of the real estate broker and the expenses of sale, the transaction resulted in a profit of $12,615.75."
The ninth account current was approved on September 21,
1953.

)

of the Trust Estate as mny be necessary if the net income available for
distribution is insufficient .•.. "
"(C) This Trust shall continue until and shall cease upon the death
of my daughter, IRENE. ... Upon such termination the entire Trust
Estate, including principal and any undistributed income, shall, after
payment of any expenses of last illness and funeral of my said daughter,
be distributed by right of representation to the issue of my said daughter..••
"Should my daughter ••• die leaving no issue then the entire Trust
Estate, including principal and any undistributed income, shall, after
payment of any expenses of last illness and funeral for my said daughter
be distrihuted as follows:
"(1) TWO-FIFTHS (2/5) thereof to FRANCIS MOELLER, or to his issue
by right of representation should he not then be living;
"(2) THREE-FIFTHS (3/5) thereof in equal shares to my brothers,
HORACE T. CHART:E:RS and CHARLES T. CHARTERS, and my sister, LAURA
HOERNER, or to the survivors or survivor of them should any of them be
not then living, or, if none of them be then living, then to FRANCIS
MOELLER, or to his issue by right of representation should he not then
be living."
• After setting forth the foregoing provisions of the will creating the
trust, the decree of distribution provided: "If the payments from the
Trust to which Irene Marie Charters, daughter of deceased, may be
entitled after she shall have attained the age of Twenty-one (21) years
shall, in the discretion of the Trustee, be insufficient to provide her with
reasonable support, care and comfort, the Trustee may pay to, apply or
expend for her use and b!'nefit so much of the principal up to and including the whole thereof as the Trustee may deem ndvisable."
After setting forth various "powers and discretions" vested in the
trustee, the decree of distribution also provided: "All discretions eonferred upon the Trustee shall, unless specifically limited, be absolute and
their exercise conclusive on all persons interested in the Trust. The
enumeration of certain powers of the Trustee shall not limit its general
powers, the Trustee being hereby vested with and having as to the trust
estate and in the execution of the trust all the rights, powers and privileges which an absolute owner of the properly would have.' I
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On Noyember 6, 1951, Irene married. On October 29, 1952,
the trustee was discharged as guardian of her estate. She
has been receiving, and it appears that she will continue to
receive $154.52 per month from life insurance policies on the
life of Iler father. The trustee has heen paying her $45.48
per month, which, when added to the payments from the
insurance policies, aggregates $200 per month. Since she
has been receiving only $45.48 a month from the trust, a
considerable amount of income has accumulated. On September 1, 1953, the trustee :filed a petition that it be instructed
what to do with the accumulated income. At the hearing on
the petition, Irene and IJaura Hoerner, decedent's sister, appeared by their respectiw attorneys. Francis :Moeller, the
other living bene:ficiary of the trust, did not appear. The
court appointed two attorneys to appear and act as guardians
a,d litem of any minor or person of unsound mind, or any
person or persons of a designated class who are not ascertainedor who are not in being and who may participate in
the trust. No testimony was taken at the hearing on the
petition except the testimony of the guardians ad litem as to
their fees. No documentary evidence was introduced except
the :file in the Matter of the Guardianship of the Estate of
Irene Marie Charters. After the hearing, the court on April
30, 1954, made, among others, the :findings quoted below8 and
entered the following orders:
"'That on February 5, 1943 the Security-First National Bank of Los
Angeles, a national banking association, was appointed guardian of the
Estate of Irene Marie Charters (then a minor); that said guardian
presented its inventory of the assets of said minor's estate; that the
testamentary trust of Spencer H. Charters, deceased, under paragraph
Fifth (A) (3) of the Last 'Will and Testamcnt of Spencer H. Charters,
gaTe the right to the use and occupancy of certain residence property
locatcd at 1745 North Vista Street, Los Angeles, California to Irene;
that said right was in the nature of a Life Estate and that said right
and/or estate was not listed in said inventory as an asset of said minor's
estate.
"That on or about the 16th day of July, 1946 the Trustee of decedent's estate under said Last Will and Testament sold the real property
at 1745 Nortb Vit'ta Street, Los Angeles, California. That said sale was
made without notice to the guardian of said minor's estate, and said
guardian did not file its petition with the Court for authority· for it to
sell said estat.e of the minor. That by reason of said sale, the Trustee
obtained $25,000.00, which BUm was then made a part of the corpus of
said Trust and has since that date and does uow make up a portion of
the said Trust Estate.
"The Estate ..• was of a value of $94,308.77 as of the date of distribution based upon the appraised value thereof.
"That the will of tbe above-named deceased, incorporated in the
Decree of Distribution. creating tbe Trust Estate, contains no express
provision for the accumulation of undistributed income and no provision

)
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"1. That petitioner, as Trustee, under the Last Will and
Testament of Spencer H. Charters, deceased, and under the
Decree of Distribution made in this cause on or about the
23rd day of May, 1944 be and it is hereby ordered to either
purchase a home and residence with suitable furnishings for
the occupancy of Irene Marie Charters Yeakel which shall be
as nearly equal in value as reasonably possible to the home and
furnishings located at 1745 Vista Street, Los Angeles, California, and which were sold by said trustee on or about the
year 1946, or to provide Irene Marie Charters Yeakel with a
sum sufficient to rent a furlli:'l1ed home of the value, approximate quality and desirability as the residence at 1745 Vista
Street, Los Angeles, California which was previously occupied
by Irene Marie Charters Yeakel, and sold by the Trustee as
aforesaid.
"2. It is further ordered that Paragraph Fifth (A) (2) of
the Last Will and Testament of Spencer H. Charters and
Paragraph Fifth (A) (2) of the Decree of Distribution made
in this cause be interpreted as a direction to the Trustee that
Irene Marie Charters Yeakel should receive a minimum of
$200.00 per month, including benefits from insurance policies
received from sources outside the Trust Estate as well as
income of the Trust Estate.
for the payment of ineome as hereinafter mentioned to any benefieiary
exeept Irene . . .
"That the Court interprets the provisions of the Trust eovering the
use of said home as a direetion to the Trustee to permit Irene to use
and oeeupy said property during the whole of her natural life if she '80
desired, and that during sueh period the Trustee is required to bear the
expense of said property and the payment of taxes thereon.
"That it was the duty of the Guardian to secure and maintain for
the minor any property rights to which she may have been entitled and
it appears to the Court that no question of this right, being namely, the
right to oeeupy said residence. was reported to the Court in the Guardianship proeeedings, nor was sueh right on the part of the minor reported
to the Court by the Trustee in connection with the sale thereof.
I I That permission of the Court in the Guardianship matter was not
sought by the Guardian to relinquish the said right of oceupaney on
the part of Irene.
"That it is the opinion of this Court that had the relinquishment of
the right of the minor to oecupy said residence been submitted to the
Court that the Court would not have given its permission for such relinqUishm.ent without adequate consideration given to the Ward.
"That the sum of $45.48, being the difference between the amount
received by Irene from insurane.e policies on the life of the above-named
deceased, and the sum of $200.00 per month is not a maximum payment
but is the minimum amount required to be paid by the Trustee in cash
for the support, care and comfort of Irene and the Trustee is entitled,
and should be instructed to expend any additional portion of the income,
up to the whole thereof, as shall be necessary to meet this obligation."
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u 3. It is further ordered that petitioner utilize any income
remaining after it has provided the minimum of $200.00 per
month including insurance payments received by Irene Charters Yeakel outside of the Trust to meet its obligation to
provide for Irene Marie Charters Yeakel's reasonable support,
care and comfort.
H 4. The intent of Spencer H. Charters as found from a
reading of his Last Will and the Trust therein contained, and
upon analysis of the facts surrounding execution of said Will,
is interpreted to mean that excess income, if any, after petitioner has carried out the terms of this Order, shall not be
accumulated but shall be distributed to Irene Marie Charters
Yeake1."
From these orders the trustee and Laura Hoerner appeal.
No briefs were filed on behalf of Laura Hoerner. [1] It is
settled, contrary to respondent's contention, that the trustee
is entitled to appeal. (Estate of Ferrall, 33 Ca1.2d 202,
204-206 [200 P.2d 1, 6 A.L.R.2d 142].)
The trustee first contends that the probate court was without jurisdiction to consider the matter of the sale of the residence on the ground that this sale was approved in the court's
order settling the third account current, and since it has long
since become final, it is not subject to collateral attack. Irene
contends that since she was a minor 16 years old when the
third account current was approved and her estate was under
the guardianship of the trustee, and since the trustee did not
list her right to occupy the residence in its inventory of the
assets of the estate or obtain authority of the court for its
sale, she was not bound by the order approving the account,
which deprived her of the right to use and occupy the residence.
[2] Once a decree of the probate court settling an account
of a trustee becomes final, it is conclusive, in the absence of
extrinsic fraud, on all parties interested in the estate. (Prob.
Code, § 1123; Security First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles Y.
Superior 001trt, 1 Ca1.2d 749, 755 [37 P.2d 69] ; Ringwalt Y.
Bank of America, 3 Ca1.2d 680, 685 [45 P.2d 967]; In re
McLellan v. McLellan. 17 Ca1.2d 552, 554 [110 P.2d 1034] ;
Willson v. Security First Nat. Bank, 21 CaUd 705, 713 [134
P.2d 800].) [3] A court has inherent power to set aside
a decree for extrinsic fraud (Oross v. Tustin, 37 Ca1.2d 821,
825 [236 P.2d 142]) when a party has been prevented from
fully presenting his case and there has therefore been no
adversary trial of the issue. (Bacon Y. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477,
491 [89 P. 317]; Howard Y. Howard, 27 Cal.2d 319, 321
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[163 P.2d 439].) [4] "The public policy underlying the
principle of res judicata that there must be an end to litigation
requires that the issues involved in a case be set at rest by
a final judgment. . .. This policy must be consid€'red together with the policy that a party shaH not be deprived
of a fair adversary proceeding in which fully to present his
case." (Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 32 Ca1.2d 13, 18 [193 P.2d
728].) Thus, the question arises at the outset whether the
foregoing rule applies, when a trustee that is also the guardian
of the estate of a minor beneficiary of a trust (who is not
otherwise repn'sented) seeks a final settlement of an account
current after selling a trust asset in which the minor beneficiary has an interest.
In Fisher v. Banta, 66 N.Y. 468, the same person appeared at a final accounting as the representative of two
estates, that of the deceased and that of his beneficiary.
After the decree had become final, legatees of the deceased
beneficiary, who had not been made parties to the final
accounting, sought to set it aside. The court stated:
"It is doubtless true that a decree made on the settlement
of Albert Banta's estate, to which the executor of Charles . . .
was a party, would, under ordinary circumstances, in the
absence of fraud •.., conclude them [legatees of Charles'
estate]. But the defendant Hubbell was the representative
of both estates. So far as the plaintiffs were concerned, the
accounting was a proceeding instituted by Hubbell as representative of one estate against himself as the representative
of the other estate. It is a familiar principle that a court
of equity will require parties having remote interests to be
brought in, when necessary to a complete disposition of the
matter in litigation [citation], and this, we think, is a case
to which this rule applies, and the . . . legatees of Charles
. . . [should] have been made parties to the accounting..•.
They ought not to be concluded by a proceeding instituted
by himself [Hubbell], against himself, in which they were
interested." (Ibid. at 481.)
Again in the Matter of Haigh, 125 Misc. 365, 367 [211
N.Y.S. 521], under similar facts, the court held that unless
persons interested in the deceased beneficiary's estate were
cited, the final decree of the accounting party representing
both estates was not conclusive upon them. The rule of the
Fisher case was subsequently codified in New York. (Surrogate's Court Act, ~ 262(10), Gilbert-Bliss, Civil Practice of
New York anno., Book l3B, 3d ed.) The purpose of this

)
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rule is to prevent a person's escaping liability by taking
advantage of his dual relationship in accounting to himself.
(Matter of Massimino, 143 Misc. 119, 121 [256 N.Y.S.32];
see also Estate of Clark, 203 Iowa 224 [212 N.W. 481].)
"[L]ogic demands that an accounting party be not permitted
in another representative capacity to stand between himself
and the ultimate beneficiary." (Re Brockway's Will, 111
N.Y.S.2d 849, 857.)
[5] The reasoning of these cases applies here. After a
sale of a trust asset in ,~hich Irene had an interest, the third
account current was rendered to the court and approved.
with the trustee accounting to itself as guardian. Thus,
since the trustee occupied a dual relationship, and Irene was
not otherwise represented, she was deprived of the opportunity to present her claims to the court. There being no
adversary trial or decision of the issue, the order settling
the trustee's third account current is not binding on her,
and the probate court therefore had jurisdiction to inquire
into it. [6] Having jurisdiction of the controversy between the trustee and the beneficiary of the trust under section 1120 of the Probate Code, the court could "bring to its
aid the full equitable and legal powers with which as a
supcrior court it is invested." (Guardianship of Cornaz,
8 Cal.2d 347. 359 [65 P.2d 784]; 8chleyen v. 8chleyen, 43
Cal.2d 361, 371-374 f273 P.2d 879]; Estate of E~7,ert, 131
Cal.App. 409, 414-417 [21 P.2d 630].)
The trustee contends (1) that the right to occupy the
residence was given only for the period Irene was under
the care of a guardian; (2) that once Irene and her guardian
vacated the residence, the right to occupy was lost and could
not be reclaimed; and (3) that once the right to occupy was
lost, the trustee could sell the residence.
[7] In support of the first proposition· the trustee relies
on the use of the word "and" with reference to the right
to occupy ["The Trustee shall permit Irene . . . and her
guardian . . . to use and occupy my residence for so long
a time as they may desire ... " (italics added)] as contrasted with the use of the word "or" with respect to the
furniture and furnishings. ["My . . . daughter or her
guardian . . . shall so long as she or they desire. have the
use . . . of the household furniture and furnishings. . ..
(Italics added)]. In view of the fact that Irene was only
10 years old at the datE' the will was executed and only 1]
years old at the date of the decree of distribiltioll. she would
necessarily be under the care of a guardian and could not

)
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decide for herself to occupy the residence. The decision to
occupy would necessarily be made by her guardian, even if
the decree had not referred to the guardian and had provided
that Irene could occupy the residence for "so long a time
as she may desire." The decree made it clear that during
her minority the decision to occupy was not Irene's alone
but that of her guardian. When her minority and the
guardianship of her person were over, there would no longer
be any need for the care of a guardian or any necessity of
a guardian to occupy the residence with her and therefore
no longer any need for a guardian's decision as to occupancy.
Thus, if Irene and her guardian had occupied the residence
during the whole period of her minority and it was Irene's
desire thereafter to continue to occupy it, we have no doubt
that she would have had the right to do so. The decree cannot
reasonably be construed as terminating the right to occupy
the residence when she reached 21 and requiring her then to
vacate it. The obvious purpose of the provision giving the
right to occupy was to provide a home for Irene. If the right
to occupy the residence was to be limited to her minority,
the decree would have plainly said so and not left the limitation to a vague inference to be drawn from a meticulous
comparison of the use of such words as "and," "or," "they,"
and "she."
[8] The second of the foregoing propositions assumes that
the occupancy must be continuous, and that once Irene and
her guardian vacated the residence they lost the right again
to occupy it. The right to occupy, however, was for "so long
a time as they may desire" and there is nothing in the decree
to indicate that their desire to occupy could be expressed
only once and not for "so long a time" any time they desired.
Thus, if the guardian had decided that it was in the best
interest of Irene for her and Irene to occupy the residence
during the time Irene was in grade school and then for Irene
to go to a girls' school, we do not believe that the decree
could rt'asonably be construed as denying them the right
thereafter to return to the residence. A disinterested guardian
of her estate would have protected the right to occupy the
residence during Irene's absences therefrom and made reasonable arrangements with the trustee for the rental thereof when
the duration of such absrnces justified such rental. As noted
above, the obvious purpose of the decree was to provide a
home for Irene for so long a time as she desired and not
simply for her minority or for one uninterrupted time only.
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[9] Since Irene and her guardian had the right during her
minority to occupy thc residence for so long a time any time
they deshed and since Irene had the right to occupy it so
long as she desired on the termination of her guardianship,
the trustee had no authority to defeat that right by selling
the residence. The court's order number (1) that the trustee
purchase a home with suitable furnishings for Irene or provide her with a sum sufficient to rent such a home must
therefore be affirmed.
[10] We agree with the trustee's contention that the
court's orders number (2) and number (3) that the $200
monthly payment is only the minimum authorized for Irene's
support and that any income in excess of that amount must
be used for her support are contrary to the express provisions
of the decree of distribution and must therefore be reversed.
(Estate of Van De'Usen, 30 Ca1.2d 285, 295 [182 P.2d 565].)
The decree, incorporating the language of the will, provides:
"From and after the date upon which Irene . . . shall
attain the age of Twenty-one (21) years, the Trustee shall
pay to said Irene . . ., during her lifetime or until the termination of the Trust Estate, such sum or amount monthly
which, when added to the payments which she may receive
from any insurance policies on the life of deceased, shall
amount to a monthly income of Two HUNDRED DOLLARS
($200.00). If the income available for distribution is not
sufficient to make the aforesaid monthly payments the Trustee
shall use such part of the principal as may be necessary to
make such monthly payments."
This provision plainly provides for $200 per month, no
more and no less, and cannot reasonably be construed as
providing that income in excess thereof shall be used for
Irene's support. If any additional sum is to be paid to
Irene, it is to be paid under the provisions of the decree that
"If the payments from the Trust to which Irene Marie
Charters, daughter of deceased, may be entitled after she
shall have attained the age of Twenty-one (21) years shall,
in the discretion of the Trustee, be insufficient to provide
her with reasonable support, care and comfort, the Trustee
may pay to, apply or expend for her use and benefit so much
of the principal up to and including the whole thereof as
the Trustee may deem advisable." (Italics added.)
Anything paid pursuant to this provision would be in the
absolute discretion of the trustee:
"All discretions conferred upon the Trustee shall, unless
specifically limited, be absolute and their exercise conclusive

Feb. 1956]

ESTATE OF CHARTERS

239

[46 C.2d 227; 293 P.2d 778]

on all persons interested in the Trust. The enumeration of
certain powers of the Trustee shall not limit its general
powers, the Trustee being hereby vested with and having as
to the trust estate and in the execution of the trust all the
rights, powers and privileges which an absolute owner of
the same property would have." (Italics added.)
[11] Thus, as this court stated in Estate of Ferrall, 41
Ca1.2d 166, 173 [258 P.2d 1009]: "An absolute discretion,
exercised in good faith by a trustee, cannot be controlled
by a court on considerations gi)ing to the soundness of the
discretions exercised."
The c·)rrt could not interfere to
review the action of the trustee in the absence of pleadings,
proof, and findings of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion.
(Estate of Ferrall, supra, pp. 170-173.) There are no such
pleadings, proof, or findings herein.
[12] We also agree with the trustee's contention that
order number (4) that excess income shall be distributed to
Irene, is contrary to the express provisions of section 733
of the Civil Code and must therefore be reversed. (See
Estate of LeFranc, 38 Ca1.2d 289, 299-301 [239 P.2d 617].)
Section 733 of the Civil Code provides:
"When, in consequence of a valid limitation of a future
interest, there is a suspension of the power of alienation or
of the ownership during the continuation of which the income
is undisposed of, and no valid direction for its accumulation
is given, such income belongs to the persons presumptively
entitled to the next eventual interest."
The decree contains no express direction for the accumulation of income. The provisions thereof that the principal may
be used if the net income available for distribution is insuffi·
cient for Irene's support during her minority, or to meet
the $200 monthly payments thereafter, or for the support
of the deceased wife's mother, and that the trustee may pay
taxes and costs of administering the trust out of principal
or income, would indicate that it was not contemplated that
income was to be accumulated, for normally there would be
no expenditures from principal until income had been expended. Thus, even though the court correctly concluded
that there was no express or implied direction for the accumulation of undistributed income, it erred in ordering its
distribution to Irene, for section 733 plainly provides that
the "income belongs to the persons presumptively entitled to
the next eventual interest." Irene is the person presumptively entitled to the next eventual interest only as to $15,000,
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the sum of the insta;l::":nts of $5,000 that she is to receive
when she attains th(; <:.g;,s of 30, 35, and 40, and to her belongs
only that proportiorJ r.,~ the accumulated income as $15,000
bears to the value (,f !t.'! total trust estate. The remainder
was given to Iren'! 'l, ;s;;ue, and as to that they were the
persons presumptiy(;J:.· <::ntitled to the next eventual interest.
If Irene died leayjq, D'J issue the trust estate was to be
distributed two-fifth--_ -~J) Frencis Moeller and three-fifths to
Horace T. Charters, O.arJc:s T. Charters, and Laura Hoerner
as provided in part~:rar;h (C) of the will. (See note 1,
supra.) It is immati;rial that Irene had no issue at the time
of the court's ord(;n, for the rights of those unborn are
entitled to protect~()r! a, well as those of the living. Furthermore, although the fa~t that a child was born to Irene on
January 26, 1955, dor:s not appear in the record, our attention
was caUed to it in l.h~ hrief filed by the guardian ad litem.
Since the court's ordr:rs will operate in futuro (cl. Cal-Dak
Co. v.Sav-On Drugs, Inc., 40 Ca1.2d 492, 496-497 [254 P.2d
497]) that fact may be considered in protecting the rights
of the child in the trust estate. (See First Nat. Bank v.
Henderson, 101 Cal. 307, 309-311 [35 P. 899].) Distribution
of aU of the undistributed income to Irene pursuant to the
court's orders wouJrl defeat the right of that child under
the express provisions of section 733 of the Civil Code.
Order number (l) is affirmed. Orders number (2), number
(3), and number (4) are reversed. The trustee shall bear
the costs of this appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J. t Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence,
J.t concurred.

